Holli Lundahl Appellant/Plaintiff vs. Judge Ray Harding Jr. and Clerk Mike Tronier Appellees/Defendants: Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Holli Lundahl Appellant/Plaintiff vs. Judge Ray
Harding Jr. and Clerk Mike Tronier Appellees/
Defendants: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joni Jones; assistant attorney general; attorney for appellees.
Holli Lundahl; pro se.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lundahl v. Harding, No. 20020240 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3750
GOO£T(JB>PI/I 
p*~" * "f^^v 
APPEAL CASE NO. 20020240-CA -n^ : -, 




JUDGE RAY HARDING JR AND CLERK MIKE TRONIER 
Appellees/Defendants 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT HOLLI LUNDAHL 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court Case 
No. 010401896 Before The Honorable Louis Tervort 
Joni Jones 
Assistant Attorney Gneral 
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Ray Harding jr 
and Mike Tronier 
Holli Lundahl 
Attorney Pro Se 
200 E. Center street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION i 
LUNDAHL'S OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ii-vi 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES vi 
LUNDAHL'S OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT 
OF THE CASE 1 
LUNDAHL'S OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT 
OF RELEVANT FACTS 1 
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 8 
II. LUNDAHL DID NOT FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANTS 8 
A. HARDING JR. DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULTS/ 
JUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST EMPIRE 
AND SOURCE ONE 8 
B. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DETERMINED 
THAT WHEN A PLAINTIFF SUBMIT'S A SUM 
CERTAIN DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 
55(b)(1) AND REQUESTS ENTRY FROM A CLERK, 
THE CLERK PERFORMS A MINISTERIAL DUTY IN 
ENTERING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 10 
III. LUNDAHL IS ENTITLED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK 
VOID INTERLOCATORY ORDERS IN ANY CASE AND IN 
ANY PROCEEDING 12 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR LUNDAHL'S ALLEGATIONS 
OF INTERFERENCE WITH AN ACTION BEFORE JUDGE 
HOWARD'S COURT 15 
V. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE HARDING JR. 
AND TRONIER ARE NOT BARRED BY ABSOLUTE 
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 16 
A. THE APPELLEES ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY 
JUDICIALLY IMMUNED UNDER THE FEDERAL 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT THROUGH EX PARTE YOUNG 17 
B. APPELLEES HAVE WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT 
THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNED UNDER 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNTY ACT 18 
LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE RAY HARDING JR. 
ARE NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA IN LUNDAHL 1 21 
LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST MIKE TRONIER ARE 
NOT BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND 
FURTHER THE APPELLEES WAIVED THE RIGHT 
TO RAISE THIS DEFENSE ON APPEAL 24 
CONCLUSION .25 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 1 Hi 
OTHER FEDERAL AUTHORITIES 
Moore's Federal Practice 3d section 60.22[3][d] 9 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 26 22 
Black's Law Dictionary 23 
UNITED STATED SUPREME COURT CASES 
Montana v. United States, 440 US 147, 164, no. 11, 99 SCt 970 (1979) 24 
Stump v.Sparkamn, 435 US 349, hnc (1978) 17 
TENTH CIRCUIT COURT 
Chesholm v. House, 160 F.2d 632(10* Cir. 1947) 23 
In re Stone, 588 F2d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir. 1978) 9 
Smith v. Plati, 258 F3d 1167, fn. 1 (10th Cir. 2001) 18 
VanSickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431 (10th Cir. 1986) 21 
OTHER CIRCUIT COURT CASES 
Havercombe v. Dept. of Ed., 250 F.3d 1, fn. 9 (1st Cir. 2001) 21 
UTAH DISTRICT COURT 
Heber v. U.S.A., 145 FRD 576(D. Utah 1992) 9 
UTAH STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 41(b) 16 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 54(b) 1 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 55(a) iv, 6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 55(b)(1) iv, 6,10,21, 24,25 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 60(b)(1) iv, vi, 2, 6, 9,12,17, 25 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Bowman v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (1946) 13 
Cf Richardson v. Grand Central, 572 P.2d 396, 397 (Utah 1977) 24 
Collins v.Sandy City Bd. Of Adjustments, 52 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2001) 13 
Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) 24 
Heathman v. Fabian & Cledenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190(1962) 8 
Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P2d 1132 (Utah 1977) 13 
Nebecker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180,184 (UT 2001) 23 
State of Utah v. South, 924 P.2d 354, fn. 3 (Utah 1996) iii, iv 
Utah Ass'n of nCredit Men v. Bowman, 113 P 63 (Utah 1931) 10 
Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul & Larsen Con. Inc., 544 P2d 876 (Utah 1980) 9 
Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co., 942 P.2d324, 326 (Utah 1997) ii, iv 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Neilsen v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 136 (UT App. 1995) 19 
Richman v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991) 9 
OTHER STATE SUPREME COURTS 
Roush v. Rous, 589 P.2d 841 (Wyo. 1979) 21 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant Holli Lundahl requests oral argument on the following grounds: 
1. Based upon the ruling in &UNDAHL i
 a nd the Utah Supreme Court's 
failure to yield a competent result in LUNDAHL I through LUNDAHL'S 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in appeal case no. 20010049 [See 
pending motion to reinstate appeal case no. 20010049-CA due to extrinsic 
mistake] & based upon Ray Harding Jr's fraud committed at both the trial 
court level and before the Utah Appellate Court, LUNDAHL requests that 
oral argument be given in this case because LUNDAHL'S Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act claim against a judicial officer is the first case to have 
ever been properly served administrative process thus giving a trial 
court subject matter jurisdiction to reach the claims of fraud and 
malice committed by a judicial officer. Accordingly the Utah Court of 
Appeals will be deciding a First Impression case. As such this case 
should be orally argued for a full comprehensive record to be considered 
by higher courts should the appellate process proceed in that manner. 
LUNDAHL'S OBJECTION TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND THE 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPROPRIATE TO THIS APPEAL 
1. Appellees claim that the entry of a default judgment is neve?: 
a ministerial matter and therefore LUNDAHL failed to state a claim for 
relief against Ray Harding Jr. [This issues raises an identical issue 
to LUNDAHLrS Issue nos, 3 & 4, but against a different official.] 
OBJECTION: LUNDAHL contends that entry of a default judgment 
under URCP rule 55(b) (1) by a clerk of the court for a sum certain pled 
in a verified complaint or by affidavit, is a ministerial matter and 
1. Mike Tronier could not enter a default judgment for money 
damages against Continental Insurance Company now CNA Financial 
Corporation aka Loes Corporation because LUNDAHL's complaint did not 
plead a sum certain damage against this defendant; therefore Lundahl's 
motion for entry of default judgment for money damages against CNA was 
accordingly plaintiff properly stated a claim against Mike Tronier 
Appellees claim that this issue was not raised in the trial 
court. 
OBJECTION: LUNDAHL directly raised this issue in the trial court 
by verified First Amended Complaint and by her joint Opposition and 
cross motion for summary judgment on her verified FAC in her favor. 
The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss with prejudice 
and thereby mooted LUNDAHL's cross claims. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the facts supporting LUNDAHL's 
claimed right to default judgments as against defendants Empire of 
America Realty Credit Corporation and Source One Mortgage Services 
Corporation are undisputed [see ultimate facts in exhibits "51" and "57" 
attached to OB] , this issue raises only a question of law for which 
this Court gives the trial courts ruling no deference and reviews it 
under the correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fos & 
Co., 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
2. Appellees claim that LUNDAHL's EX PARTE YOUNG declaratory 
relief and injunction claim against them is an attempt to collaterally 
attack final decisions of Ray Harding Jr and therefore not permitted. 
[This issue is similar to the second part of LUNDAHL's issue no. 2.] 
OBJECTION: LUNDAHL denies that her EX PARTE YOUNG claim does not 
allow her to collaterally attack void interlocutory orders which 
2 
represent imminent and prospective harm to her. 
2. It should be noted that one month after Ray Harding Jr 
entered the at issue interlocatory orders, Ray Harding jr refused to 
certify the foregoing interlocutory orders as final under rule 54(b) or 
to sever LUNDAHL's claims against the foregoing defendants from her 
unrelated claims against the other defendants. Additionally the Utah 
Supreme Court denied LUNDAHL's petition for interlocutory appeal under 
rule 5. [See exhibit "35" attached to OB for this order.] Subsequently 
Appellees claim that the foregoing issue was not raised in the 
trial court. 
OBJECTION: It is true that the appellee's did not raise a 
collateral attack defense during the trial of the underlying action and 
accordingly should not be permitted to raise this defense now. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: No review should be permitted on this 
question. See State of Utah v. South, 924 P.2d 354, fn 3 (Utah 1996) 
(refusing to address argument offered on appeal in defense of lower 
court's decision where argument was not raised in pleadings or argued by 
the parties below.) 
3. Appellees claim that LUNDAHL sought to add new claims and 
causes of action that were not set out in her original notice of claim 
or her original complaint. [This issue is similar to the first part of 
LUNDAHL's issue no. 2.] 
OBJECTION: LUNDAHL filed TWO Notices of claims as set forth in 
exhibits "1" and "3" attached to the Opening Brief. LUNDAHL's Second 
Notice of claim identifies the fraud committed by Ray Harding Jr. in 
LUNDAHL I and additional fraud committed by Mike Tronier in case no. 
the state action was removed to the federal court and consolidated with 
a federal action which was ordered indefinitely stayed until final 
disposition of several state actions pending in the third judicial 
district court in Salt Lake. [See exhibit "10" in O.B., second part, 
the court docket for stay order.] Because the interlocutory orders 
entered by Ray Harding Jr. are part of the stayed federal case which has 
now been stayed for 3H + years and is likely to be stayed for additional 
years, because Ray Harding Jr refused to certify his interlocutory 
orders as final and because the Utah appellate court refused to grant 
LUNDAHL permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal [see exhibit "35" 
attached to O.B.], the questioned orders were not able to be turned over 
or brought into question in the same proceeding. URCP rule 1, FRCP rule 
1 and the First Amendment petition clause entitle LUNDAHL to a speedy, 
just and inexpensive resolution of her claims. LUNDAHL has been denied 
these rights. In addition LUNDAHL has suffered past and stands to 
suffer future harm based upon Harding Jr's freezing of proper and fair 
appellate review of the interlocutory orders as more fully exculpated in 
this brief. 
990402021 and other actions LUNDAHL had pending before other courts. 
Post filing the second Notice of Claim, LUNDAHL merged the claims 
presented in both Notices into her First Amended Complaint. 3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below on defendants 
motion to dismiss. Because the issue raises only a question of law, the 
Court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it under 
the correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co., 94? 
P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
4. Appellees claimed that they were entitled to absolute 
judicial immunity under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. [This Issue 
raises similar issues to LUNDAHL'S issue nos. 3-8.] 
OBJECTION: LUNDAHL claimed that both official and personal 
immunities were waived under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act because 
the rule 60(b) subject matter jurisdiction violations committed by Ray 
Harding Jr; the rule 55(b)(1) violations committed by Mike Tronier in 
case no. 990402021, and; the rule 55(a) violations by Mike Tronier in 
case no. 990403068 were ministerial acts not entitled to official 
immunity protection. Furthermore LUNDAHL argued that she had sued th^ 
defendants personally under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and that 
the personal defense of absolute judicial immunity was waived under the 
UGIA since the defendants performed or failed to perform their duties 
3. In December of 2001, the trial court claimed lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction over LUNDAHL's clciims presented in the second Notice 
of claim because the second notice was served upon the Attorney General 
after the action was commenced by the original complaint. In other 
words LUNDAHL was not permitted to merge additional claims and facts 
which became actionable by the Second Notice of claim into the pending 
action by the filing of a First Amendc^d Complaint. The trial court was 
incorrect in dismissing LUNDAHL7 s Utah Governmental Immunity Act Claim 
as it pertained to the second Notice of Claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because the doctrine of merger and bar required LUNDAHL tQ 
merge her administrative claims. 
through fraud and malice. Under federal law, the appellees actions were 
not immuned under the EX PARTE YOUNG Doctrine. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided on defendant's motion 
to dismiss. Because the facts were undisputed, this issue only raises a 
question of law which this Court reviews under the correctness standard 
granting the trial court's ruling no deference. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 
942 P.2d at 326. 
5. Appellees claim that all of LUNDAHI/s claims against Ray 
Harding Jr. are barred by res judicata. [This issue is similar to 
LUNDAHL'S issue nos. 1 & 2.] 
OBJECTION: LUNDAHL claimed that Ray Harding Jr's fraud committed 
in LUNDAHL I barred res judicata application and further that the trial 
court lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act claim at the time LUNDAHL I was commenced because the 
administrative process had not yet run it's coarse. 
This issue was raised by defendant's motion to dismiss. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the facts underlying this claim were 
undisputed, this issue raises solely an issue of law which this Court 
reviews under a correctness standard granting no deference to the trial 
court's ruling. ZIONS, supra. 
6. Appellees claim that all of LUNDAHL's claims against Deputy 
clerk Tronier are barred by Collateral estoppel by the prosecution of 
LUNDAHL I against Ray Harding JR. Appellees admit this issue was not 
raised in the trial court below. 
OBJECTION: This issue was not raised in the trial court below 
and therefore appellees have waived this issue on appeal. 4 
4. Moreover contrary to Appellees contention, this court is 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellees waived the right to challenge this 
issue because it was not raised in the trial court below. State v. 
South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 (Utah 1996). 
7. APPELLEES HAVE WAVED THE RIGHT TO ARGUE THAT RAY HARDING JR'S 
RULE 60(B) (1) RULINGS MADE WITHOUT THE FILING OF THE REQUIRED MOTIONS BY 
EMPIRE OF AMERICA AND SOURCE ONE MORTGAGE WITHIN THE 3 MONTH STATUTORY 
TIME PERIOD UNDER RULE 60(B)(1), DEPRIVED RAY HARDING JR OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION TO GRANT EMPIRE AND SOURCE ONE ANY EQUITABLE RELIEF 
FROM THE DEFAULT ORDERS/JUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST THEM. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
LUNDAHL AGREES WITH APPELLEES DETERMINATIVE STATUTES PLUS ADDS: 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60(b) (1) : 
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (2) newly 
discovered evidence...; (3) fraud whether heretofore denominated as 
intrinsic or extrinsic; misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; ...the motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1) , (2) & (3) , not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order or proceeding entered or taken. 
additionally barred from considering this issue because Tronier was not 
made party to the EX PARTE YOUNG claim prosecuted against Ray Harding 
Jr. in LUNDAHL I and because the issue of Mike Tronier's failure to 
enter a sum certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE in his capacity 
as the clerk under URCP rule 55(b)(1) was never argued or raised in 
LUNDAHL I nor was Tronier's failure to enter certain default 
certificates in case no. 990403068 an issue raised in LUNDAHL I. 
LUNDAHL sought decrees declaring: (1) the October 12, 1999 
interlocutory order vacating the defaults/judgments against EMPIRE and 
SOURCE ONE void based upon Ray Harding Jr's lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction to grant equitable relief to EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE, (2) 
the January 25, 2000 oral dismissal order as to LUNDAHL's claims against 
CNA [committed to writing on February 18, 2000], void, as not barred 
by res judicata; (3) the March 7, 2000 order quashing LUNDAHLAs service 
on SOURCE ONE as allegedly improper, as void; and (4) the order granting 
dismissal of LUNDAHL As claims against EMPIRE on the basis of the 
December 10, 1995 accord & settlement agreement, as void, on the basis 
that LUNDAHLAs claims against EMPIRE accrued after the December 10, 1995 
fifi^lement acrreement termed. 
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees fail to acknowledge that when LUNDAHL filed an 
Opposition to appellees motion to dismiss her First Amended Complaint, 
Lundahl also cross moved for summary judgment in her favor on her claims 
set forth in her First Amended Complaint. Moreover on December 27, 2001 
LUNDAHL filed a rule 54 (b) motion to correct the December 10, 2001 ordes 
not a rule 59 order. On February 22, 2002 the trial court entered a 
final judgment affirming the December 10, 2001 ruling on the motion to 
dismiss while simultaneously denying LUNDAHL7 s rule 54 (b) motion which 
sought to declare the defendants jurisdictional argument as moot. 
Appellees statement of the case is otherwise correct. 
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEES STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Appellees are correct that they did not challenge the factual 
claims made in LUNDAHL's FAC which comprise nearly identical facts as 
presented by LUNDAHL in her statement of facts set forth in her opening 
brief. Furthermore the defendants did not challenge the validity of 
any document attached to the FAC, which documents are now attached to 
the Opening Brief and support LUNDAHLys factual contentions. 
2. Appellees are correct that LUNDAHL sued 19 defendants in state 
case no. 990402021 and obtained default certificates against 3 of the 19 
defendants named in state case number 990402021 after these 3 defendants 
were properly and personally served and failed to appear. 
OBJECTION: Appellees fail to note however that LUNDAHL also 
submitted and obtained a sum certain default judgment against defendant 
EMPIRE [ex. "51" attached to O.B.] and submitted a sum certain proposed 
default judgment against SOURCE ONE [ex. "57" attached to O.B.]. 
3. Appellees are correct that Ray Harding Jr. conducted a hearing 
on September 23, 1999 pursuant to LUNDAHL'S request to enter a default 
judgment for uncertain money damages against CNA. 
OBJECTION: Appellees fail to note however that 40 days prior to 
the hearing date, Judge Harding Jr. ordered SOURCE ONE and EMPIRE to 
appear for the September 23, 1999 hearing by way of rule 60(b)(1) in 
order to challenge the default judgment entered against EMPIRE and the 
sum certain default judgment LUNDAHL sought against Source One. Although 
counsel for EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE appeared at the September 23, 1999 
hearing, they did not file any rule 60(b)(1) motions to set aside the 
defaults or default judgments entered against them. Moreover they also 
did not file these motions after the September 23, 1999 hearing and by 
the deadline of October 9, 1999 as ordered by Ray Harding Jr. 
4. Appellees incorrectly state that Harding Jr. at the hearing 
set aside the default judgments against CNA and EMPIRE and on October 
12, 1999 set aside the default of Source One. 
OBJECTION: Judge Harding Jr. only set aside the default 
judgment as to CNA on September 23, 1999. At this hearing Judge Harding 
Jr. instructed EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE'S counsels to file rule 60(b)(1) 
motions by October 9, 1999 so that he would have subject matter 
jurisdiction to set aside the default judgment against EMPIRE [see 
exhibit "51" attached to OB] and the default order against SOURCE ONE. 
See ex. "31" attached to FAC. In fact neither EMPIRE nor SOURCE ONE 
filed the required rule 60(b)(1) motions by the October 9, 1999 
deadline. Judge Ray Harding Jr. LIED in his October 12, 1999 order, 
ruling no. 6, when he stated that EMPIRE had filed the required motion 
to grant EMPIRE relief from a default judgment [See ex. "30" attached to 
OB.]; EMPIRE never filed any such motion and the docket verifies that 
no such motion was filed by EMPIRE. Moreover Ray Harding Jr had no 
authority to grant Source One sua sponte relief from a default ox 
judgment without SOURCE ONE's filing of the required motion. Ray Harding 
Jr. failed to acquire subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the default 
judgment against EMPIRE [ex. "51" attached to O.B.] and the default and 
proposed sum certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE [ex(s) "56" & 
"57" attached to O.B.]. 
5. Appellees state that Ray Harding Jr. granted CNA'S motion 
to dismiss on January 25, 2000 [in written order on February 18, 
2000] and Source One's motion to quash on March 7, 2000. 
OBJECTION: This statement omits other pertinent material 
facts. Specifically, Appellees fail to acknowledge that the basis for 
the dismissals were void and fraudulent. Specifically, Ray Harding Jr 
corruptly held that: (1) LUNDAHL's mortgage interference claims against 
Continental Insurance Company were barred by an unrelated interlocutory 
order entered by a federal court dismissing LUNDAHL's claims against an 
unrelated CNA entity for ERISA violations respecting health care 
contracts. The res judicata argument was also invalid because 
Continental Insurance Company was not a party to the Utah federal 
action, was not served process in the federal action and never made a 
general or special appearance in the federal action. Therefore the 
federal judgment could not have prejudiced LUNDAHL's claims against 
Continental Insurance Company in the action before Harding Jr's court; 
i 
(2) LUNDAHL had not properly served Source ONE. This was also a false/ 
and (3) On March 15, 2000 Ray Harding Jr fraudulently dismissed 
5. It is important to note that Ray Harding Jr conducted no 
evidentiary hearing to determine the propriety of LUNDAHL's service on 
Source One. Under Utah law, Ray Harding Jr. was required to look to the 
documentary evidence on file with the court to determine the propriety 
of service and any disputes in the documentary evidence were required to 
LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE claiming that LUNDAHL'S claims accrued 
during the contract period identified in the December 10, 1995 Accord 
and Settlement Agreement. This was also a false statement of fact.* 
LUNDAHL'S FAC alleged that Ray Harding Jr had no valid legal 
basis to dismiss LUNDAHL's claims against CNA and EMPIRE nor to quash 
and dismiss LUNDAHL's claims against SOURCE ONE. 
6. On April 12, 2000 LUNDAHL brought a federal civil rights 
action against Ray Harding Jr. claiming that Ray Harding JR. violated 
LUNDAHL's federal civil rights by adjudicating equity claims on 
defendants EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE, by vacating the default judgments 
entered against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and by subsequently dismissing 
LUNDAHL's claims against all three defendants in interlocutory orders 
which Ray Harding Jr refused to certify as final. 7 
be determined in LUNDAHL's favor. A review of the returns of service 
on file [ex(s) "52" & "53" attached to OB] prima facially established 
the question of propriety of service in LUNDAHL's favor. Ray Harding 
Jr. was therefore barred from quashing said service upon SOURCE ONE 
nearly one year after SOURCE ONE was served as he was mandated to 
determine any disputes in the documentary evidence in LUNDAHL's favor. 
6. LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE did not commence until April 
9, 1996, 9 days after the federal court approved Accord/Settlement 
Agreement terminated by it's own terms. The record shows that EMPIRE 
recorded a false assignment document which had been back dated to a date 
before the federal court approved December 10, 1995 settlement agreement 
in order to nullify the settlement agreement for lack of capacity to 
contract by EMPIRE. As a matter of law, LUNDAHL had the right to (1) 
enforce the federally approved settlement agreement, (2) charge EMPIRE 
with having filed a wrongful lien/encumbrance against LUNDAHL's real 
property which stated a false assignment date, ommitted the existence 
of the federally approved settlement agreement, and was not supported 
by consideration until April 30, 1996, and; (3) charge EMPIRE for 
emotional and mental distress damages for aiding and abetting a wrongful 
foreclosure. 
7. Appellees only identify a portion of the true facts in the 
civil rights action LUNDAHL brought against Ray Harding Jr in LUNDAHL I. 
The following facts are also material. First, LUNDAHL did not sue Ray 
Harding Jr. in his personal capacity for money damages in LUNDAHL I. 
Ray Harding Jr. was sued strictly in his official capacity under EX 
PARTE YOUNG for declaratory and injunctive relief. On appeal Ray 
Harding Jr fraudulently argued that LUNDAHL sued him personally for 
money damages in order to corruptly obtain an appellate judgment in his 
7. Appellees correctly state that on April 24, 2000 LUNDAHL filed 
a Notice of Claim against the defendants. On August 8, 2001 LUNDAHL 
brought a Second Notice of claim to include the fraud and malice 
committed by Ray Harding Jr in the prosecution of LUNDAHL I and other 
fraud and malice committed by Tronier in other unrelated cases wherein 
LUNDAHL sued a CNA merged entity. 
OBJECTION: Appellees fail to acknowledge that on April 13, 2001 
LUNDAHL timely filed the underlying action to address the personal fraud 
and malice claims presented in her first Notice of claim. LUNDAHL thep 
amended her underlying complaint to include the additional claims made 
in her second notice of claim which were directed to the fraud committed 
favor. Wiile LUNDAHL argued on appeal that she did not sue Harding Jr. 
for Money damages but only sued him to EX PARTE YOUNG relief, the Utah 
appellate court completely disregarded LUNDAHL's argument. In addition 
Ray Harding Jr. to fraudulently obstruct LUNDAHL's EX PARTE YOUNG claim 
on appeal, argued that the challenged interlocutory orders were final 
and ready for appeal - thus causing the appellate court to again 
disregard LUNDAHL's pleadings and sustain a finding that LUNDAHL was 
seeking retrospective relief. Ray Harding Jr never produced evidence to 
sustain his defense that his interlocutory orders were final and 
appealable, and it is clear that Ray Harding Jr defrauded the trial 
court into believing that such interlocutory orders were made final by a 
subsequent order issued by Ray Harding Jr. [See hearing transcript of 
oral argument as exhibit "38" attached to OB.] Harding Jr. also 
concealed to the appellate court that LUNDAHL did not have an adequate 
remedy in the federal court after the state action had been removed 
because the federal action had been ordered indefinitely stayed. Ray 
Harding Jr's false representations resulted in an obstructed and void 
appellate judgment against LUNDAHL. See Appellees Appendix "A". 
Additionally, Appellees fail to acknowledge that LUNDAHL requested 
rehearing of the appellate order which was denied. [See ex. "41" 
attached to OB.] On May 20, 2001 LUNDAHL filed a petition for 
certiorari review. [See ex. "1" attached hereto.] The docket in the 
appellate case shows that on March 20, 2002 the Supreme Court denied a 
petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal and issued a 
remittitur. [See exhibit "2" attached hereto.] A recent review of the 
appellate file revealed no such order issued on March 20, 2002 or any 
remittitur issued on that same date. Instead the file erroneously 
included an order dated August 21, 2001 denying a petition for 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal; an order which belonged in 
another case filed by LUNDAHL. LUNDAHL'S petition for certiorari 
review of the May 3, 2001 appellate order has never been adjudicated by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
by Ray Harding Jr in the prosecution of LUNDAHL I. Appellees correctly 
state that they objected to the court considering the second notice of 
claim because it was merged into an action which had commenced 5 months 
earlier on the First Notice of claim and LUNDAHL's merger violated the 
procedural requirements for prosecuting an UGIA claim. LUNDAHL argued 
that the doctrine of merger and bar required she amend the complaint to 
include the second allegations. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Holli Lundahl claims that Judge Harding Jr. violated the 
jurisdictional statutes under URCP rule 60(b)(1) with respect to EMPIRE 
and SOURCE ONE and thereby entered void orders vacating 
defaults/judgments against these defendants
 r that Harding Jr's clerk 
Tronier should have entered the sum certain default judgment against 
SOURCE ONE under URCP rule 55(b)(1), and that Tronier should have 
entered defaults against LILLY, Advanced Cardiovascular Systems and 
Leahy in case number 990403068 under URCP rule 55(a). 
LUNDAHL contends that the entry of a default judgment for sums 
certain pled in a complaint and or supported by affidavit under rule 
55(b) (1) is a ministerial act. LUNDAHL further contends that she stated 
a valid legal basis for obtaining default judgments against all three 
defendants. The record shows that Mike Tronier and Ray Harding Jr 
engaged in a fraudulent and malicious conspiracy with attorneys for the 
defendants to claim: (1) that LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE were 
barred by the federally approved December 10, 1995 settlement agreement, 
(2) that LUNDAHL was not entitled to a default judgment against CNA as 
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LUNDAHL's claims against CNA were allegedly barred by res judicata , 
and (3) that LUNDAHL had not properly served SOURCE ONE ; thereby 
justifying Tronier's failure to enter the sum certain default judgment 
LUNDAHL submitted to TRONIER. 
The record shows that Appellees made no effort to argue in 
either the trial court or this court that Ray Harding Jr acted without 
subject matter jurisdiction to grant EMPIRE or SOURCE ONE equitable 
relief from the final defaults/judgments; thus rendering Ray Harding 
JrAs equity orders VOID and subject to collateral attack in any 
proceeding. 
In addition the defendants failed to acknowledge that LUNDAHL is 
unable to appeal the removed interlocutory orders in the federal court 
due to an indefinate stay order; thus leaving LUNDAHL with her federal 
remedy under the EX PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE. Neverthless this did not 
deprive LUNDAHL of her state civil rights remedy under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
The trial court was not without subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear LUNDAHL's UGIA claims presented in second Notice of claim because 
8. Harding Jr concluded that LUNDAHL's claims before his court 
for mortgage interference, insurance bad faith, fiduciary fraud, etc. 
against Continental Insurance Company, LUNDAHL's homeowners insurer, 
which accrued on December 13, 1996, were identical to claims LUNDAHL 
had pending before the Utah federal court against an ERISA health 
contract insurer known as Continental Assurance Company which accrued on 
July 23, 1993. 
9. To avoid entry of LUNDAHL^ submitted default judgment 
against SOURCE ONE, Ray Harding Jr sua sponte quashed LUNDAHL's service 
upon this defendant falsely claiming it was improper. Ray Harding Jr 
violated the common law rules respecting challenges to service of 
process which required that any dispute in documentary evidence go in 
favor of the plaintiff. Moreover SOURCE ONE did not provide competent 
evidence to dispute LUNDAHL's service returns as to SOURCE ONE. Finally 
SOURCE ONE did not file any rule 60(b)(1) motion to challenge the 
sufficiency of service of process within the time allowed under Utah 
even though Ray Hardin Jr had twiced petitioned SOURCE ONE to do so 
within the 3 month limitations period. 
under the doctrine of merger and bar LUNDAHL had an obligation to merge 
her claims and by the time the trial court ruled as to this defense the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction was mooted. 
Under the UGIA, neither defendants are entitled to personal 
judicial immunity. LUNDAHL's claims against Harding Jr are not barred 
by res judicata by LUNDAHL I because of the fraud Ray Harding Jr. 
committed in the prosecution of LUNDAHL I and because the administrative 
process was not completed to permit the trial court to acquire subject 
matter jurisdiction over LUNDAHLxs UGIA claim. Moreover the appellate 
process in LUNDAHL I is still ongoing and has never reached a valid, 
final or competent disposition of the* violations committed in LUNDAHL I 
as contemplated in the statutory scheme. Finally plaintiffs claims 
against Mike Tronier are not barred by collateral estoppel because (1) 
the defendants did not raise this dcsfense in the lower court (2) Mike 
Tronier was not named a partyr was not served process and did not appear 
in LUNDAHL I, and (3) LUNDAHL's claims against Tronier were never fully 
and fairly litigated in LUNDAHL I. 
ARGUMENT 
H. LUNDAHL DID NOT FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 
A. HARDING JR. DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
TO VACATE THE DEFAULTS/JUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST 
EMPIRE AND SOURCE ONE 
APPELLEES claim that LUNDAHL's entitlement to a sum certain 
default judgment against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE was not a ministerial act 
of Tronier's office. 
Appellees quote to a common law authority supporting the right to 
relief from a default when a timely motion is made under rule 60(b)(1) 
in re Heathman V. Fabian & Cledenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (1962), I.e. 
"that default judgments are not favored. . .and when a timely motion under 
rule 60(b) (1) is filed, the court should grant relief and hear the 
action on it's merits." However in the case at bar, neither EMPIRE 
nor SOURCE ONE filed timely motions under rule 60(b)(1). "Utah courts 
do not recognize distinctions between relief procedures employed to 
obtain relief from defaults or default judgments". Heber v. U.S.A., 145 
F.R.D. 576 (D. Utah 1992) citing to Moore's Federal Practice 3d section 
60.22 [3] [b] . "In both instances defendants are required to file motions 
to set aside the default or default judgment." Id at 577. "Failure to 
file the required motion within 3 months of the challenged order, 
judgment or proceeding, deprives the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to grant any relief." Richman v. Delbert Chipman & Sons 
Co., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991) (citing to URCP rule 60(b). 
Moreover rule "60(b)(1) only permits relief if the movant can 
demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense." In re Stone, 588 
F2d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir. 1978) . Also "a primary factor in setting a 
default or judgment aside is whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced." 
Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con. Inc., 544 P2d 876, 879 
hn 3 (Utah 1980). 
Here neither EMPIRE or SOURCE ONE filed the required motions under 
rule 60 (b) to obtain relief... likely because they had no meritorious 
defenses. In addition LUNDAHL was severely prejudiced by the vacatior* 
of the judgments not only because the acts were prohibited under the 
jurisdictional rules of 60(b)(1) but also because EMPIRE was in 
dissolution and there was no means by which to obtain enforcement of any 
money judgment against EMPIRE unless LUNDAHL obtained the money judgment 
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before the dissolution was complete. With respect to SOURCE ONE, 
10. EMPIRE has now dissolved thereby leaving LUNDAHL's only 
LUNDAHL has now been forced to file bankruptcy proceedings to stave off 
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Creditors related to her home illegally stolen by SOURCE ONE. 
Not surprisingly, the defendants have not addressed Ray Harding 
Jr's lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the equity proceedings as to 
EMPIRE and SOURCE, nor did they attack this established factual 
contention in the trial court. Appellees have therefore conceded that 
the October 12, 1999 order vacating LUNDAHL's defaults/judgments 
against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE are void. Being VOID LUNDAHL is entitled 
to collaterally attack them in these proceedings. 
B. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT WHEN A 
PLAINTIFF SUBMITS A SUM CERTAIN DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 55(B) (1) AND REQUESTS ENTRY FROM A CLERK, 
THE CLERK PERFORMS A MINISTERIAL DUTY IN ENTERING 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Attached hereto as exhibit "69" is the only Utah Supreme Court 
authority opining duties under URCP rule 55(b)(1) in re Utah Ass'n of 
Credit Men v. Bowman, 113 P 63 (Utah 1911) . A clerk in an identical 
fact pattern as the case at bar, entered a default but refused to enter 
a default judgment in plaintiff's favor based upon sum certain damages 
pled in plaintiff's complaint. The clerk, likened to the case at bar, 
forwarded the default judgment onto the judge who then refused to order 
the clerk to enter the default judgment. A writ was filed to the Utah 
Supreme Court to compel performance of the ministerial duty. The 
Supreme Court decisioned that it was not an answer to the writ that the 
judge directed the clerk not to perform her duties, [hn.4]. The High 
Court also held that when a complaint states a sum certain damage 
supported by admissible evidence and the defendant does not respond, the 
remedy as an action against the defendant Ray Harding Jr. for 
obstruction of LUNDAHL's right to obtain and enforce her judgment 
against EMPIRE. 
11. In addition failure to enter judgment against SOURCE ONE has 
resulted in multiple lawsuits being filed against Holli Lundahl. 
defendant makes a tacit admission, as in a judgment by confession, that 
the cause sued upon is valid and that the money damages claimed are 
owed. Id at 67. Furthermore the court directly decisioned: 
"The only difference in entering a judgment 
by confession and a judgement by default 
...is that in the first instance the defendant 
in proper terms confesses the judgment 
while in the second he tacitly consents by his 
silence that the judgment may be entered against 
him for the amount claimed in the complaint. 
IN ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREFORE, IN EITHER CASE, 
THE CLERK ACTS MERELY MINISTERIALLY, AND WITH 
EITHER THE EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED CONSENT OF THE 
DEFENDANT." ID at 67. 
The appellees argue that entering a default judgment is 4 
discretionary judicial function because a court is required to confirm 
whether the facts set forth in the complaint support the legal claims, 
citing to Pennington, etc. None of the cases cited by appellees 
involved a complaint which had attached thereto admissible documents 
establishing the plaintiff's claims as a matter of law or pleaded sum 
certain and statutory damages, likened to the case at bar. On the 
contrary, the case to which appellees cite involved an action where the 
plaintiff was found to have pursued a bad faith breach of contract 
action against his car insurance company for failure to pay medical 
expenses in excess of his policy limits. . The plaintiff did not admit 
in his initial complaint that he himself had breached his own insurance 
contract before his carrier did. The court sanctioned the plaintiff 
$25,000 in attorneys fee for bringing the bad faith action. 
Furthermore the plaintiff in Pennington petitioned the court, not the 
clerk, UNDER RULE 55(B)(2) to enter default judgment. That case and 
others cited by Appellees are therefore distinguishable. 
In Harding's court, LUNDAHL petitioned the clerk for entry of sum 
certain default judgments against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE. LUNDAHL'S 
factual allegations and causes of action were fully supported by th§ 
necessary contracts, public recording documents, previous trial 
testimony and discovery documents. Under rule 55(b)(1), LUNDAHL had 
the statutory right to make her submissions for default judgments to the 
clerk considering the fixed nature of LUNDAHL As facts and claims. The 
clerk had no authority to deny LUNDAHL entry of the sum certain default 
judgments, especially when LUNDAHL'S judgments on their face contained 
sufficient admitted facts, set forth the legal claims under which 
LUNDAHL grounded her entitlements, and set forth authorized liquidated 
damages. [See exhibit "51" attached to OB for Empire's Judgment.] [See 
ex. "57 attached to OB for SOURCE ONE'S judgment.] 12 If the defaulted 
defendants questioned the propriety of the judgments, there was a 
statutory scheme available to the defaulted to obtain relief, if timely 
made. It is a safe presumption that if the defendant does not obtain 
timely relief from a default judgment, especially when given clear 
advance notice and opportunity to obtain relief by the court as in the 
case at bar, the defendants conceded that the judgments were based upon 
13 
valid claims. 
III. LUNDAHL IS ENTITLED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK VOID 
INTERLOCATORY ORDERS IN ANY CASE AND IN ANY PROCEEDING 
12. SEE ADDENDUM "A" attached hereto for a factual and legal 
synopsis establishing the validity of LUNDAHL'S claims against EMPIRE 
and SOURCE ONE. 
13. Restated, on August 13, 1999 Judge Harding Jr. ordered 
CNA, EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE to appear at the September 23, 1999 by proper 
motion under rule 60(b). When these defendants counsels failed to 
properly appear, Judge Harding Jr. again ordered EMPIRE and SOURCE 
ONE'S counsels to file the required motions by October 9, 1999 to give 
the court subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief. Still these 
defendants did not comply. It therefore cannot be said that these 
defendants did not effectively consent that LUNDAHL had stated proper 
claims against them. 
Appellees falsely claim that LUNDAHL's entire action is an effort 
by LUNDAHL to relitigate valid and final decisions from prior lawsuits 
to which LUNDAHL disagreed with the results. IN TRUTH, THE 
INTERLOCATORY DECISIONS LUNDAHL ATTACKS WERE NOT VALID AND WERE NOT 
FINAL. The Utah courts have long held that where the record shows that 
a judgment was entered without subject matter or personal jurisdiction, 
the judgment is void and may be collaterally attacked anywhere and at 
anytime. Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (1946) . Here the claim is that 
Ray Harding Jr. vacated default judgments against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE 
without subject matter jurisdiction; thus permitting LUNDAHL to 
collaterally attack Ray Harding Jr's rulings in any proceeding. 
Appellees next claim that no trial judge has the authority to 
alter decisions alleged to be erroneous [or in this case void] , even if 
the decisions are interlocutory, citing to Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P2d 
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1132 (1977) which is based upon the law of the case doctrine. Aside 
from the fact that the defendants waived this argument in the trial 
court and therefore should not be permitted to raise it on appeal, the 
law of the case doctrine has no application to the case at bar as it 
requires the same action to impose the rule. The underlying action is a 
different action naming different parties. 
Appellees next cite to inapplicable state authority Collins v. 
Sandy City Bd. Of Adjustments, 52 P.3d 1267, holding that a plaintiff 
who fails to appeal a final decision cannot normally collaterally attack 
that decision in a new action. This authority is also inapplicable 
because there are no final decisions at issue which permitted LUNDAHL 
access to an appeal. Next the appellees cite to Supreme Court authority 
14. However, the law of the case doctrine has evolved and the 
Utah appellate courts now hold, "Not withstanding the law of the case 
doctrine, a trial court is not inexorably bound it's own precedents." 
Jones Constructors, 761 P2d at 45. "A judge or co-ordinate sitting 
in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 US 477 (1994) holding that unless a conviction 
is overturned or otherwise declared invalid by an appellate court, a 
defendant has no cognizable section 1983 claim. This authority is 
inapplicable because the challenged orders did not derive from a 
criminal conviction and LUNDAHL has never had the opportunity to appeal 
the challenged interlocutory orders. The Correct rule of law 
applicable to the question of collateral attack on interlocutory orders 
is the EX PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE. 209 US 123 (1908). This doctrine 
specifically permits a suit against a judge in his official capacity for 
prospective equitable relief to remedy 14th amendment violations; such 
as those that might be presented by void interlocutory orders that 
represent an imminent and irreparable harm to a litigant. Smith v. 
Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, fn. 1 (10th Cir. 2001). As previously stated, 
the interlocutory orders represent imminent and ongoing harm to LUNDAHL. 
While LUNDAHL once before sought relief under this doctrine, Ray 
Harding Jr. corrupted the process through his continued fraud committed 
at all levels of the trial and appellate proceedings. Appellees falsely 
argue that since LUNDAHL lost her statutory review proceedings in 
LUNDAHL I, LUNDAHL should be barred from filing the underlying action. 
In fact LUNDAHL has not lost the appellate proceedings in LUNDAHL I 
because LUNDAHL's Petition for Writ of Certiorari has never been 
disposed. [See Lundahl's motion filed in appeal proceedings case no. 
20010049 to dispose of LUNDAHL's petition for writ of certiorari.] 
Appellees also purport to hold LUNDAHL responsible for this 
court's or the federal court's failure to overturn the challenged orders 
judge is tree to change a ruling until a final decision as been formally 
rendered. URCP rule 54(b). Ron Shepard Inc. v. Shields, 882 P2d 650, 
652-654 (Utah 1994). 
by deceptively claiming that LUNDAHL did not attempt to bring these 
orders into question in the action formerly before Ray Harding Jr's 
Court. This statement is a blatant lie. A review of the court docket 
in re case no. 990402021 shows that LUNDAHL filed a rule 54(b) motion 
for certification which Harding Jr. refused. LUNDAHL then requested 
interlocutory review under rule 5. This was denied by the Utah Supreme 
Court in 2000. [See ex. ' 35" attached to OB.] LUNDAHL also requeste4 
review by extraordinary writ and this was rejected in 2000. LUNDAHL then 
sought her federal remedy under EX PARTE YOUNG. This was obstructed 
because Ray Harding Jr lied to the trial court in those proceedings by 
falsely representing that the challenged orders were final and 
immediately subject to appeal through the normal processes. Ray Harding 
Jr then continued to perpetrate his fraud upon the appellate court by 
asserting that the orders were final and subject to immediate appeal in 
the federal court resulting in an obstructed and void appellate order. 
Now 31/2 years later LUNDAHL seeks her federal and state remedies for 
Harding Jr's gross fraud and malice in the performance or non-
performance of his duties. The defendants petition to this court to 
affirm the dismissal of LUNDAHL's underlying action on the basis of an 
alleged impermissible collateral attack lacks merit and should be 
denied. Furthermore the appellees fraud and malice with respect to the 
challenged orders has never been previously heard in any forum and 
therefore cannot be precluded from being heard in this forum« 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTON TO HEAR 
LUNDAHL'S ALLEGATIONS OF INTEFERENCE WITH AN ACTION BEFORE JUDGE 
HOWARDS COURT 
Appellees argue that because LUNDAHL did not raise her 
interference claims in her original notice of claim, the trial n.wr* 
was without jurisdiction to consider the interference claims. Appellees 
then argue Notice requirements under the UGIA. LUNDAHL concedes that 
Appellees are correct about the notice requirements. However on page 
14, para. 3, Appellees admit that LUNDAHL filed a second Notice of claim 
including the additional allegations regarding interference with 
proceedings before Howard's Court. Appellees complain that LUNDAHL filed 
her first Amended Complaint including the new allegations in the Scond 
Notice of Claim, before the 90 days for review had expired by the 
state. Appellees than argue that "plaintiff failed to show that the 
second notice of claim was ever denied" [an implied requirement before 
proceeding on an action under the UGIA. } LUNDAHL concedes that she 
prematurely filed her FAC. However after the FAC was filed, the 90 days 
had expired, and in support of LUNDAHL'S REPLY papers, LUNDAHL filed a 
declaration with the court attesting that the second notice of claim was 
effectively denied when the state failed to respond by November 6, 2001 
and therefore any jurisdictional defect was cured. In the alternative 
LUNDAHL requested that the court refile her FAC and responses to a date 
after November 6, 2001 to permit merger of her claims. The Court chose 
not to do so. LUNDAHL contends that the defect became moot by the time 
the court issued its order on December 10, 2001. If this Court should 
concur with the trial courts ruling, it was nevertheless clear error 
for the trial court to have dismissed the claims subject matter of 
LUNDAHL's second notice of claim with prejudice on the grounds of lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. See URCP rule 41(b) - dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice. 
V. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST HARDING JR AND TRONIER ARE NOT 
BARRED BY ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
A. THE APPELLEES ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY JUDICIALLY IMMUNED UNDER THE 
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
THE FACTS STATED BY APPELLEES ARE FALSE. Plaintiff's claims 
against Harding Jr are based upon Harding Jr acting without subject 
matter jurisdiction and fraudulently and maliciously vacating 
defaults/judgments against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and fraudulently and 
maliciously dismissing LUNDAHL's claims against CNA as barred by res 
judicata. LUNDAHL's claims against TRONIER is based upon his failure to 
enter a sum certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE in case no. 
990402021 and defaults and sum certain default judgments against LILLY, 
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems and Leahy in case no. 990403068 for 
specifically pled equitable relief. LUNDAHL's FAC clearly alleged the 
jurisdictional defect on Harding JR's equity rulings and TRONIERxs 
ministerial violations. Appellees claim that LUNDAHL's claims against 
TRONIER was mooted by Harding Jr's decisions to vacate the default 
judgments against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and hence argue this defense as 
to Harding jr only. 
Appellees argue a plethora of federal civil rights cases standing 
for the correct legal proposition that a judge cannot be sued for money 
damages unless "the court's subject matter jurisdiction is circumscribed 
by statute or case law," [See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US 349, hn c 
(1978)], or the court acts in a non-judicial manner. LUNDAHL agrees. 
In the case at bar however Harding JR's sub ject matter jurisdiction over 
the defaults/default judgments of EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE was 
circumscribed by statute and by case law under rule 60(b)(1) and 
Richins, supra, because EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE never filed the required 
motions to give Harding Jr subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore he 
was not protected by absolute judicial immunity under the federal civil 
rights act. Nevertheless LUNDAHL did not sue Harding Jr for money 
damages under the federal civil rights act. LUNDAHL'S suit against 
Harding Jr under the federal civil rights act was limited solely to EX 
PARTE YOUNG declaratory and injunctive relief. The 10th circuit in re 
Smith v. Plati, 258 F3d 1167, fn 1 (10th Cir. 2001) held to the long 
established rule that a state official can be sued in his official 
capacity for prospective equitable* relief to remedy violations to the 
Constitution or other federal laws citing to EX PARTE YOUNG, 209 US 123 
(1908). Because Harding Jr violated LUNDAHL'S 14th amendment right to 
be free from deprivation of property [a cause of action is property] 
without due process of law and because Harding Jr's violations are 
ongoing and continue to inflict prospective harm upon LUNDAHL. Under 
the doctrine, LUNDAHL was entitled to decrees declaring the October 12, 
1999 order VOID as to EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and the February 18, 2000 
order void as to CNA. LUNDAHL was also entitled to a permanent 
injunction order compelling reinstatement of the defaults and default 
judgments against EMPIRE AND SOURCE ONE as a matter of law and to a jury 
trial of LUNDAHL7s claims against CNA. 
B. APPELLEES HAVE WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY 
JUDICIALLY IMMUNED UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
All of the state and federal authorities cited by appellees deal 
solely with immunities available under the federal civil rights act. 
APPELLEES HAVE NOT ARGUED AND THEREFORE HAVE WAIVED ANY CLAIM TO 
PERSONAL IMMUNITIES UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. It is 
uncontested that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives personal 
immunity for officials of the state if they act with fraud and malice in 
the performance or non-performance of their duties. U.C.A. section 
63-30-4(3) (b) ; Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 136 (UT App. 1995). 
The record shows that Harding Jr acted with malice in vacating 
defaults/judgments entered against EMPIRE and SOURCE because he acted in 
reckless disregard of the law and LUNDAHL's legal rights on matters for 
which he had no subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover Harding Jr could 
not claim any misconduct on the part of LUNDAHL that led to EMPIRE and 
SOURCE ONE'S defaults because Judge Harding Jr. himself twice ordered 
EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE to file the required motions to give his court 
subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the defaults/judgments entered 
against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE on July 9, 1999. These defaulting 
defendants twice chose with deliberation not to file the required 
motions within the statutory time periods. On October 12, 1999, to 
overcome the jurisdictional defect, Harding Jr executed a deceptive and 
fraudulent interlocutory order whereby he falsely represented that 
EMPIRE had filed the required motion and that he was granting relief to 
SOURCE ONE sua sponte. He also vacated the default against CNA which 
was a legally permissible given CNA did file the required motion within 
the time allowed by law. However Harding Jr's malice and fraud did not 
stop there. On October 12, 1999 when he vacated the judgments against 
EMPIRE, SOURCE ONE and CNA, he also ordered the parties to file 
responses within 30 days to LUNDAHL's Verified FAC. Again the only 
party to file a response was CNA who fraudulently claimed that LUNDAHL's 
claims before Harding Jrs court relating to the wrongful foreclosure of 
her home, were identical to the Anti trust and police brutality claims 
subject matter of a Utah federal action. 16 On February 18, 2000 Ray 
16. During the prosecution of CNA's motion to dismiss, LUNDAHL 
provided Harding Jr's court with commercial publications showing that 
CNA Financial Corporation was the surviving corporation to a merger with 
over 120 companies formerly belonging to Continental Corporation and for 
which Continental Insurance Company and Continental Assurance Company 
Harding Jr not only maliciously and fraudulently barred LUNDAHL claims 
before his court but based upon the global and broad nature of his 
order, Harding Jr barred LUNDAHL from bringing any claim against any CNA 
related entity forevermore. QMA then subsequently presented this 
corrupted order to every court wherein LUNDAHL and a CNA entity were 
named parties. Morover to further maliciously injure LUNDAHL, Harding 
Jr then subsequently dismissed LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE as 
covered by the federally approved December 10, 1995 settlement agreement 
and unilaterally quashed service of LUNDAHL's process upon SOURCE ONE by 
falsely claiming that LUNDAHL had improperly served SOURCE ONE. After 
these dispositions, there were no remaining claims against CNA, EMPIRE 
or SOURCE ONE. LUNDAHL moved for rule 54(b) certification which Harding 
denied. LUNDAHL sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal which 
was denied by the Utah Supreme Court. LUNDAHL sought extraordinary 
relief which was denied. LUNDAHL'S action was then improperly removed 
to the federal court, ordered consolidated and then indefinitely stayed. 
In the meantime: (1) some of LUNDAHL's unrelated claims against other 
unrelated CNA entities were dismissed as barred under res judicata by 
Harding Jr's interlocutory order [It should be noted that LUNDAHL still 
has two state actions pending against unrelated CNA merged corporation 
parties which LUNDAHL has not yet served CNA to avoid the corrupt effect 
of Harding Jrs void interlocutory order; hence these state cases are in 
limbo.] (2) LUNDAHL has filed bankruptcy to avoid creditors created by 
were separate merged corporation parties insuring different legal 
interests. LUNDAHL provided Harding Jr's court with the homeowners 
insurance policy at issue before Harding Jr's Court and the ACS ERISA 
health plan document which Continental Assurance Company insured in the 
federal court. LUNDAHL testified that the injuries in Harding Jr's 
Court and the injuries in the federal action were completely different, 
the transactions and contracts at issue were unrelated, the causes 
accrued at the very least 4 years apart from each other, no evidence was 
alike, and the parties were not the same nor in privity with one 
another. 
the theft of her home by SOURCE ONE and a number of these creditors have 
filed adversary proceedings against LUNDAHL, and (3) EMPIRE has 
undergone dissolution making payment of the judgment impossible. 
Under the UGIA, there were no legal justifications for Harding 
Jr's fraudulent and malicious conduct towards LUNDAHL and under the UGIA 
LUNDAHL is entitled to money damages as a matter of law. 
With respect to TRONIER, he fraudulently refused to enter the sum 
certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE under URCP rule 55(b)(1). 
Hence if this court does not reinstate the default judgment against 
SOURCE ONE, Tronier along with Harding Jr should be held liable to 
LUNDAHL for the judgment amount therein stated as well as any additional 
actual, special and/or punitive damages LUNDAHL might be therefore 
entitled. 
Vi LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST RAY HARDING JR ARE NOT BARRED BY 
RES JUDICATA IN LUNDAHL I 
HARDING JR claims that LUNDAHL's claims against Harding JR are 
barred by the prosecution of LUNDAHL I. First, LUNDAHL I only sued 
Judge Harding in his official capacity. The underlying action sues 
Judge Harding Jr. in his personal capacity. The federal and state 
courts generally hold that a subsequent action that sues the defendant 
in a different capacity as the prior action, does not bar prosecution of 
the second claim. Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841 (Wyo. 1979); Also 
VanSickle v. Halloway, 791 F2d 1431 (10th Cir. 1986). In addition, 
LUNDAHL could not have included her state law claims in the prior 
federal action because the administrative process had not completed on 
the federal claims. See Havercombe v. Dept. of Ed., 250 F.3d 1, fn 9 
(1st Cir. 2001) citing to exceptions in the claim spitting rule in 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 26, cmt c ("where formal 
barriers existed against full presentation in the first action/' such as 
where subject matter jurisdiction is limited in the court of the first 
action thus preventing plaintiff from relying on a theory of law or a 
form of remedy) or, id., cmt j (where the defendant has committed fraud 
in the prosecution of the first action by concealing material evidence). 
Respecting the first exception above stated, LUNDAHL argued in her 
opening brief that she could not prosecute her state law UGIA claims in 
the EX PARTE YOUNG declaratory/injunction action because the tribunal in 
the EX PARTE YOUNG action lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
LUNDAHL'S UGIA claims until the administrative process had completed. 17 
In response thereto, Judge Harding argues that LUNDAHL should have 
waited to file her federal civil rights action until the state law 
claims became actionable. However as set forth supra, LUNDAHL stood in 
risk of not being able to recover her damages against EMPIRE due to 
dissolution, LUNDAHL was attempting to prevent multiple lawsuits from 
being prosecuted against her by creditors on her home which had been 
admittedly stolen by SOURCE ONE, and LUNDAHL needed to nullify the 
effect of Harding' s void res judicata ruling as to CNA before CNA 
successfully used this fraudulent ruling to obstruct the prosecution of 
7 other unrelated actions against other CNA merged entities pending 
before 7 different federal and state courts. [See pending appeal case 
no. 20010845, LUNDAHL v. HOTSY, et al where CNA successfully used 
17. Harding Jr. has deferred to federal court decisions holding 
that it was not necessary to obtain a right to sue letter from a state 
agency in order for a Title IV federal civil rights court to hear 
plaintiff's state law civil law civil rights claims. First Harding Jr 
appears to want his cake and eat it to as he has argued that LUNDAHL 
should not be able to proceed on the claims presented in her second 
notice of claim because LUNDAHL filed an amended complaint joining the 
allegations of the second notice of claim, before the state of Utah 
issued a denial letter on the claims presented in the second notice. 
Harding Jr.'s interlocutory order as res judicata bar to the prosecution 
of an automobile personal injury action.] The Utah Supreme Court in 
Nebecker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180, 184 (UT 
2001) citing to well established law affirmed "As a general rule 
parties should exhaust administrative remedies before bringing 
constitutional claims... However exceptions to this rule exist in unusual 
circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some 
oppression or injustice is or will occur such that it would be 
unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance immediately.") 
LUNDAHL met these exceptional circumstances. 
With regards to the second contention, Ray Harding Jr committed 
fraud in both the trial court and the appellate court in the prosecution 
of LUNDAHL I by concealing a very material fact to wit: that the 
challenged orders were not final but were interlocutory thereby barring 
LUNDAHL from seeking EX PARTE YOUNG prospective declaratory/ injunctive 
relief. Not only does Harding Jr's commission of fraud bar the 
application of res judicata in accordance with Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, cmt f because the prior court was unable to yield a coherent 
disposition of LUNDAHL's EX PARTE YOUNG claim due to Harding Jrs fraud, 
IB. Black7 s law dictionary defines fraud by a state official as 
"a misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in it's truth to 
induce another person [public officer or member] to act." The 
definition cites to 10th circuit authority, Chesholm v. House, 160 F2d 
632 (10th Cir. 1947) (fraud by an official occurs when official executes 
reports [or in the instance of a judge - orders] , which are false and 
misleading, with knowledge that the orders will inflict unjustified or 
unauthorized injury upon a person subject to the report or order.) 
Fraud on the court is defined by Black's law dictionary as serious 
misconduct in a proceeding as committed by an officer of the court such 
that the integrity of the judicial process is undermined. Legal and 
constructive fraud is defined as unintentional or intentional deception 
that causes injury to another. Malice by an official is defined as 
"'reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights." 
Deception and misrepresentation is defined as creating or confirming by 
words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false... and that is 
likely to effect the judgment of another in the transaction. 
but also because Restatement (Second) of Judgments, cmt d [exhibit "66" 
attached to OB] precludes res judicata when the judgment in the first 
action was plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable 
implementation of a statutory scheme [here the appellate scheme] . 
[Refer back to exhibits 1-2 attached hereto for showing that even the 
appellate courts committed due process errors in addressing the claims 
in LUNDAHL I]. As stated in Montana v. United States, 440 US 147, 164, 
no. 11, 99 S Ct 970, 979 n.ll, 59 L Ed 2d 210 (1979), the high court 
held that "If there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness or 
fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation, redetermination of 
issues and claims are warranted." Finally, the challenged orders are 
and were clearly interlocutory. Utah Courts have long held that 
interlocutory orders are not entitled to res judicata or law of the case 
effect. Cf Richardson v. Grand Central ., 572 P.2d 396,397 (Utah 1977). 
VTL LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST MIKE TRONIER ARE NOT BARRED BY 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND FURTHER THE APPELLEES WAIVED 
THE RIGHT TO RAISE THIS DEFENSE ON APPEAL 
TRONIER did not raise the defense of collateral estoppel in the 
lower court action and should not be permitted to argue this defense on 
appeal. "Issues not raised in trial court may not be raised on appeal." 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). In addition issue 
preclusion could not otherwise apply because Tonier was not made a party 
to LUNDAHL I, Harding Jr was not sued in Tronier's capacity as a clerk 
for failing to perform statutory duties under URCP rule 55(b)(1) and 
55(a), the issues of Tronier's failures to perform certain statutory 
duties was never litigated in LUNDAHL I, Harding Jr committed fraud upon 
the trial and appellate courts in LUNDAHL I and therefore such 
obstruction would translate to Tronier, and LUNDAHL could not present 
all of her claims in LUNDAHL I. Based thereon, this court should not 
consider much less affirm a dismissal of LUNDAHL's claims against 
Tronier on this ground. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's dismissal order, find the underlying complaint not barred under 
the theory of collateral attack, by res judicata or by collateral 
estoppel, find LUNDAHL's action not barred by absolute judicial 
immunity, find the acts under the subject matter jurisdiction 
provisions of rule 60(b) (1), and the default functions under rules 55(a) 
and (b) (1) ministerial, find appellees failed to performed their 
ministerial duties and acted with fraud and malice, find appellees 
personally liable to LUNDAHL as a matter of law, grant LUNDAHL's claim 
for EX PARTE YOUNG declaratory and injunctive relief and reinstate the 
default judgments entered against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE, vacate the 
dismissal order as to CNA, remand this action to the trial court with 
permission to add CNA as a party, allow LUNDAHL to prosecute her claims 
against CNA on the merits under the claims presented in case no. 
990402021 and as a joint conspirator with Harding Jr and Tronier, and 
order that this case be sent to a jury for a trial on the damages 
incurred after the EX PARTE YOUNG relief granted by this court. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
The verified FAC in re 990402021 showed that LUNDAHL sued EMPIRE for: 
wrongful lien; RICE violations for fiduciary fraud, recording of a false 
instrument & communications Fraud; emotional and mental distress; a 
declaration that the December 10, 1995 Settlement Contract was valid anc|i 
enforceable; attorneys fees and contractual prejudgment interest. All, 
that LUNDAHL needed to prove was that: <1) an encumbrance operating as 
a lien was recorded against LUNDAHL's property, (2) the encumbrance/lien 
contained false information; (3) the false information was communicated 
to LUNDAHL and others; (4) the fraudulent scheme would likely deprive 
LUNDAHL of valuable properties; and (5) [in the case of wrongful lien} 
LUNDAHL was actually injured by recordation of the false 
encumbrance/lien. LUNDAHL in her judgments specifically identified her 
causes of actions against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and the admitted facts 
which would support her causes of actions. [Refer to ex. "51" attached 
to OB for true and correct copy of EMPIRES' judgment.] The established 
facts in EMPIRE'S Judgment showed that: (1) EMPIRE assigned all rights, 
obligations, interests, benefits, duties and liabilities under LUNDAHL's 
mortgage contract to SOURCE ONE on April 9, 1996, (2) EMPIRE cashed 
LUNDAHL's April 1996 mortgage payment before assignment, (3) all of 
LUNDAHL's mortgage duties under the First Note and Trust Deed were 
current to the date of April 30, 1996, (4) the December 10, 1995 
settlement agreement was valid and enforceable; (5) On April 9, 1996 
EMPIRE recorded a wrongful lien against LUNDAHL's property by filing an 
assignment contract which had been fraudulently backdated to the date of 
October 30, 1995, which was not then supported by any consideration, 
and which was an endeavor to invalidate the settlement contract approved 
as valid and final by a California federal Court; (6) the recording of 
the false and void assignment contract ultimately resulted in actual 
damages to LUNDAHL as it was instrumental in obtaining a wrongful 
foreclosure against LUNDAHL's real property in December of 1996; (7) the 
filing and recording of the false assignment contract constituted a 
material breach of LUNDAHL's settlement contract, was a wrongful lien 
under the Utah wrongful lien act, and constituted fiduciary fraud on 
EMPIRE'S part because EMPIRE was purporting to convey property rights to 
a third person under a VOID contract knowing that certain ommissions 
under the contract would injure LUNDAHL. LUNDAHL alleged contractual 
damages against EMPIRE in the amount of $5,000. The judgment identifies 
trebled damages of $15,000 being awarded to LUNDAHL as authorized under 
the wrongful lien statute and the fiduciary fraud statute. LUNDAHL also 
sued EMPIRE severally for emotional and mental distress. The record 
shows that LUNDAHL served EMPIRE with requests for admissions wherein 
she asked EMPIRE to admit that a damage award of $25,000 for emotional 
and mental distress would be fair for EMPIRE xs participation in the 
schemes alleged by LUNDAHL in her complaint. These admissions were made 
part of the trial record before Tronier properly entered the default 
judgment against EMPIRE. Also under Utah RICE, LUNDAHL was entitled to 
any attorneys fees expended for prosecution of her claims. [It should be 
noted that LUNDAHL paid attorney Mary Ann Hansen $2500 for special 
) 
assistance in the prosecution of her claims regarding her home.] In 
addition, in accordance with the mortgage contract LUNDAHL entered into 
with EMPIRE, LUNDAHL was entitled to prejudgment interest and other 
costs for prevailing on any claims relating to her mortgage contract. 
THE JUDGMENT SET FORTH IN EXHIBIT "51" ATTACHED TO THE OB WAS BASED ON 
ADMITTED FACTS AND WAS SUPPORTED BY VALID CLAIMS PLED BY LUNDAHL IN THE 
FAC. 
AS to SOURCE ONE, a referral to exhibit "57" attached to the OB -
the judgment - shows the following admitted facts and identifies 
LUNDAHL xs valid legal claims against SOURCE ONE. The admitted facts 
are: (1) the backdated assignment contract on the 1st Note and trust 
deed held by EMPIRE and recorded on April 9, 1996 was VOID because it 
was backdated and because no consideration supported the assignment, (2) 
the assignment of LUNDAHL's mortgage contract did not occur until April 
30, 1996 when Source One supported the assignment contract with 
consideration and the mortgage note was actually delivered to SOURCE 
ONE; (3) All of LUNDAHL's obligations as the trustor under the 1st Note 
and Trust Deed were current to the date of April 30, 1996; (4) SOURCE 
ONE received LUNDAHL7 S May 1, 1996 mortgage payment and refused to cash 
same in violation of the Mortgage* Servicing Act; (5) SOURCE ONE 
illegally froze Holli Lundahl's mortgage account commencing June 1, 
1996; (6) Holli Lundahl never defaulted upon her obligations under the 
1st Note and Trust Deed; (7) SOURCE ONE had no legal justification for 
recording an instrument declaring Holli Lundahl in default; (8) The 
Notice of Default contained false msLterial statements; (9) SOURCE ONE 
caused innocent people to publish said false Notice of Default for the 
purpose of defrauding LUNDAHL of money properties or other valuable 
things constituting a violation of the Utah Fraudulent Communication 
Fraud Act; (10) SOURCE ONE was a beneficiary, a self appointed 
trustee and a fiduciary to Holli Lundahl under the 1st Note and Trust 
Deed; (11) SOURCE ONE never served LUNDAHL statutory notice of the 
Default or the trustee's sale thereby rendering both VOID; (12) 
recording of the Notice of default constituted the filing of a wrongful 
lien in that it was materially false on it's face; (13) on December 13, 
1996 without notice to LUNDAHL, SOURCE ONE became the owner to 
LUNDAHL's home at a trustee sale at which no one but SOURCE ONE 
appeared; (14) SOURCE ONE on December 13, 1996 converted $1,089,000 in 
CONTRACTUALLY INSURED valuable real and personal properties belonging to 
LUNDAHL on a 6500 square foot home with a pool, spa, decks, H acre 
fully landscaped lot in an affluent neighborhood 1 block from the provo 
temple; (15) LUNDAHL was entitled to treble the actual damages 
sustained from the conversion, under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act; Utah 
RICE and RICO totaling $3,267,000.00; (17) LUNDAHL was entitled to 
statutory attorneys fees in the amount of $50,000 under RICE; (18) 
SOURCE ONE was a constituent entity of Fireman's Insurance Company of 
Newark New Jersey at all times herein mentioned; (19) CNA Financial 
Corporation owns Fireman's Insurances Company of Newark New Jersey; (20) 
CNA Financial Corporation owned Continental Insurance Company which 
insured LUNDAHL's home against any losses LUNDAHL sustained; (21) CNA's 
position as a mortgagee under the name of SOURCE ONE and CNA's position 
as the insurer on LUNDAHL's mortgaged real property violated the 
conflict of interest rules under the Utah Insurance Code and rendered 
the assignment contract void under U.C.A. section 31A-4-107 (2) , and (22) 
SOURCE ONE committed a wrongful foreclosure. In addition, LUNDAHL 
served upon SOURCE ONE requests for admissions wherein LUNDAHL requested 
SOURCE ONE admit the amount of statutory damages LUNDAHL would be 
entitled under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act; admit the amount of special 
damages LUNDAHL would be entitled to for intentional infliction of 
emotional and mental distress for a wrongful foreclosure, admit 
attorneys and other contractual fees LUNDAHL would be entitled to as a 
matter of law. The record shows that SOURCE ONE received LUNDAHL's 
requests for admissions and never filed an objection. These requests 
for admissions were submitted in support of LUNDAHL's default judgment 
against SOURCE ONE. [See ex. >x57" attached to OB for default judgment.] 
Since LUNDAHL stated valid claims against Source One and sought sum 
certain damages, then Tronier had a ministerial duty to enter 
LUNDAHL's default judgment against SOURCE ONE under rule 55(b)(1) and 
Harding Jr could not sua sponte set aside LUNDAHL's default against 
SOURCE ONE because he lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so and 
because LUNDAHL stated valid claims against SOURCE ONE. 
